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We analyze land use regulation and the determinants thereof across the majority of 
Swiss municipalities. Based on a comprehensive survey, we construct several 
indices on the ease of local residential development, which capture various aspects 
of local regulation and land use coordination across jurisdictions. The indices 
provide harmonized information about what local regulation entails and the local 
regulatory environment across municipalities. Our analysis shows that, among 
others, historical building density, socio-demographic factors, local taxes, cultural 
aspects, and the quality of natural amenities are important determinants of local 
land-use regulation. We test the validity of the index with regard to information 
about the local refusal rates of development projects and show that the index 
captures a significant part of the variation in local housing supply elasticities. Based 
on a machine learning cross-validation model, we impute the values for non-
responding municipalities. 
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1. Introduction
Local land use regulations affect the amount, location, and architecture of residen-
tial development. The existing literature establishes a clear relationship between land
use regulations and inelastic housing supply.1 As documented by Glaeser and Gyourko
(2018) the inelastic housing supply has profound economic implications. Inelastic hous-
ing supply leads to higher house prices (Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016; Cosman et al.,
2018), spatial misallocation of labor (Hsieh and Moretti, 2019), and lower migration
response of households (Diamond, 2017). However, land use regulations also foster eco-
nomic, environmental, and social goals. They limit the negative externalities arising
from congestion, pollution, and overbuilding. Therefore policymakers must find the
right balance in land use regulations. To analyze the impact of land use regulations, it is
inevitable first to understand the nature of local land use regulatory environments. Yet,
systematic information about regulatory instruments and the degree of regulation across
local jurisdictions is still scarce.2 In this paper, we construct a residential regulatory
constraints index for Switzerland and contribute to a growing literature on the impor-
tance of land use regulation. Our results show a substantial variation in the instruments
used for land-use regulation, the agents involved in the process, and the outcome of
the regulatory process. We find that municipalities with a historically high population
density as well as touristic places are more regulated. Switzerland provides an interest-
ing setting to study land use regulation since it displays a high degree of autonomy of
local jurisdictions such that we obtain variation in the regulatory instruments used at
a fine spatial scale. Moreover, urban sprawl and the increasing land use for residential
and touristic purposes have increased concerns in recent decades (see Hilber and Schöni,
2020). Finally, local jurisdictions also have considerable fiscal autonomy (see Roller and
Schmidheiny, 2016), allowing us to explore interactions between land use regulation and
local taxation.
Most of the land use regulation literature focuses on the US. Pendall et al. (2006) use
a survey to discern how the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the US regulate land use
and promote housing affordability. They find that the instruments employed by these
areas vary widely across space. Also using a survey, Gyourko et al. (2008) develop a
comprehensive residential land use regulatory index for over 2,600 communities across
1See Gyourko and Molloy (2015) for a literature review.
2While the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index provides such information for the US,
we are not aware of such an analysis for an European country.
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the US.3 The authors expound that the coastal markets are more highly regulated.
Gyourko et al. (2019) renew this index with a new survey. The new results show that
the Great Recession did not lead to significant changes in regulation. Glaeser and Ward
(2009) examine the causes and consequences of land-use regulations in Greater Boston.
Their analysis establishes a positive link between historical density and regulations.
Additionally, they corroborate that regulations like minimum lot size requirements are
associated with reductions in new construction activity. Brueckner and Singh (2018)
compute a land use regulatory stringency measure for five US cities. Specifically, they
estimate the elasticity of the land price with respect to floor to area ratio (FAR). Their
estimates indicate that New York and Washington, D.C. suffer the stringiest height
regulations.
The literature for Europe is scarce and we are not aware of an index about regulatory
constraints of land use in Europe. Buechler et al. (2019) evaluate the role of geographic
and regulatory constraints on the Swiss housing supply elasticity. They distinguish be-
tween regulatory constraints on the intensive and extensive margin. However, due to a
lack of data, they rely on proxies to quantify the intensive margin regulatory constraints.
There is no comprehensive and harmonized information about the local regulatory envi-
ronment for Switzerland. To fill this gap, we conducted a survey among all municipalities
in Switzerland and construct an aggregate index that documents how regulation of res-
idential buildings varies across the 26 cantons and more than 2000 municipalities in
Switzerland. We name this measure the CRED4 Ease of Residential Development Index
(CERDI).
In Switzerland, cantons regulate land use by defining their zoning plans. These zoning
plans are subject to general guidelines dictated by the federal government.5 However,
land use regulations are primarily under the municipalities’ control. Municipalities have
a wide array of instruments to control residential developments in several ways. Most
evidently, they can set regulations that simply ban development. However, regulation
can also obstruct developments by restricting the intensity and type of development, or
by delaying a project. Moreover, regulations may be influenced by local residents. To
cover the most important factors of this complex regulatory environment, we develop
several sub-indices.
3The authors call this measure the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI).
4Note that CRED stands for the Center for Regional Economic Development of the University of
Bern.
5The concepts and plans set according to Article 13 of the Federal Act on Spatial Planning (RPG)
represent the most important spatial planning instruments of the federal government.
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To construct the sub-indices, we firstly rely on responses from a nationwide survey on
land use regulation. We complement this with rich regulation data. The sub-indices are
divided into three categories. The first one pertains to the process of local regulation.
In this category, we document who is involved in the regulatory process and how much
influence they have over it. The second category captures the rules of extensive margin,
intensive margin, and financial regulatory constraints. The last category relates to the
outcomes of the regulatory process and rules. By comprising these three categories the
CERDI indicates, with a simple number, how restrictive the regulations of local housing
markets are across Switzerland. Note that a lower number indicates a less restrictive
environment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the method-
ology to construct the sub-indices and the CERDI. Section 3 explains the machine learn-
ing (ML) methods employed to predict the CERDI for non-responding municipalities.
Section 4 presents the land use regulation, determinants, housing, and external validation
data. Section 5 reports the variation in regulatory stringency across Swiss municipalities
and analyses the determinants of land use regulation. Section 6 concludes.
2. Methodology
To outline the most crucial aspects and the heterogeneity of local land use regulations,
we proceed as follows. First, we document the process, rules, and outcome of land
use regulations with ten sub-indices. To construct these sub-indices, we use answers
from a comprehensive survey conducted in 2019 (see Appendix A.2) and land use
regulation data (see Section 4.1). Second, we merge these sub-indices into a single
index. This final index, named CERDI, captures the degree of land use restrictiveness
across municipalities.
2.1. Land use regulation process
The involvement of actors and stakeholders in the land use regulation process differs
across municipalities and cantons. The following three sub-indices reflect this involve-
ment.
Citizens involvement index (CII): The CII measures how citizens influence the reg-
ulatory process. As argued by Frieden (1979), what we today know as NIMBYism can
be a significant deterrent of development. We use the answers to the following ques-
tions to construct this index. Question 1 item (m) asks how involved voting citizens are
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in affecting residential spatial planning. Question 3 item (e) asks how important the
cooperation/coordination with voting citizens is, for spatial planning regarding residen-
tial building in the municipality. Question 5 item (h) asks how the citizens opposition
to urban sprawl restricts the construction of residential dwellings in the municipality?
Question 11 asks how many objections to building permit applications did the munici-
pality receive in the year 2019. The first component of the CII is based on the sum of the
individual responses to Question 1 item (m), Question 3 item (e), and Question 5 item
(h). The second component is the number of objections to building permit applications
in 2019 (Question 11) divided by the number of building permit applications (provided
by Question 10).
Municipality involvement index (MII): Switzerland’s federalist structure leaves mu-
nicipalities considerable freedoms in affecting the regulatory process. This index cap-
tures the municipalities’ involvement in this process. The following questions provide
the basis for the MII. Question 1 items (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) ask how involved the
municipality executive body, legislative body, municipal secretary, building commission,
and municipal administrative unit are in affecting residential spatial planning. Question
3 items (a) and (b) ask how important the cooperation/coordination with municipal-
ities in the same canton and in neighboring cantons is, for spatial planning regarding
residential building in the municipality. Question 5 item (g) asks how the municipality
executive body opposition to growth restricts the construction of residential dwellings
in the municipality. The index is composed of the sum of the individual responses to
Question 1 items (a), (b), (c), and (e), Question 3 items (a), (b), and Question 5 item (g).
Cantonal involvement index (CAII): The CAII looks at the cantonal involvement in
the regulatory process. This index only varies at the cantonal level. We use the answers
of the following questions to construct the index. Question 1 items (f) and (g) ask how
involved the inter-municipal administrative unit and cantonal administrative unit are in
affecting residential spatial planning.6 Question 5 items (f) and (i) asks how the noise
regulations and monument protection authority restrict the construction of residential
dwellings in the municipality. To construct the CAII, we first sum up the individual
responses to Question 1 items (f), and (g) and Question 5 item (f) and (i). Second, we
average these sums at the cantonal level because municipalities may view the cantonal
6Note that the inter-municipal administrative unit is technically not managed by the cantons.
Nonetheless, we include it in the CAII because the cantons often coordinate these units.
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involvement differently. For example, a municipality in the country side may underesti-
mate the cantonal involvement because the restrictions are not binding.
Organizations involvement index (OII): The OII measures how other organizations,
such as cooperatives or associations influence the regulatory process. We use the answers
to the following questions to construct this index. Question 1 items (h), (i), (j), (k), and
(l) asks how involved a external planning office, cooperatives, associations, land owners,
and investors are in affecting residential spatial planning. Question 3 items (c), (d), and
(f) asks how important the cooperation/coordination with associations, land owners,
and others are, for spatial planning regarding residential building in the municipality.
The OII is based on the sum of the individual responses to Question 1 items (d), (i),
(j), (k), and (l), and Question 3 items (c), (d), and (f).
2.2. Rules of regulatory constraints
Land use regulations affect residential developments on the extensive, intensive, and
financial margin. Extensive margin regulatory constraints are measures that prevent new
construction on developed land. One example is the protected forests. Intensive margin
regulatory constraints govern the intensity and type of residential development. They
include regulations on, e.g., height restriction or open space requirements. Financial
regulatory constraints include, e.g., affordable housing requirements or the requirement
to pay for pertinent infrastructure. The following six sub-indices capture the rules of
regulatory restrictions.
Project approval index (PAI): The PAI looks at the required organizations to approve
a new construction project. The answers to Question 4 provide the basis for this index.
The listed organizations range from the municipal executive body to voting citizens.
The PAI is the simple sum of the organizations required to approve a new construction
project that does not need a rezoning. Thus, higher value for the PAI indicates stricter
regulations.
Density restrictions index (DRI): Density restriction comes in many forms. In
Switzerland, the most prevalent density restrictions are height restrictions, limits to
the number of floors, FAR restrictions, and limits to boundary distances. The DRI re-
lies on a series of questions about how binding these density restrictions are. Question
5 items (b) and (c) asks the importance of density restrictions and minimal density
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requirements for the regulation of residential dwellings in the municipality. Question 6
specifies and asks which of the prevalent density restrictions are the most relevant for
the regulation of residential dwellings in the municipality. Question 7 items (a) i., and
ii. ask if developers have to meet minimum lot size requirements, and/or FAR require-
ments to build single and multi-family dwellings. Question 7 items (b) i., and ii. ask if
developers have to meet minimum lot size requirements, and/or FAR requirements to
build large area developments.
Extensive margin regulation index (EMRI): An important form of regulation is the
protection of certain areas from development. The regulations on the extensive margin
include crop rotation areas, forests, high amenity value areas, and UNESCO cultural
and natural heritage sites (see Section 4 for a detailed description). The first component
of the EMRI is the share of land that is protected by the regulations on the extensive
margin (provided by Buechler et al., 2018). The second component is the response to
Question 5 item (a). This question asks the importance of land supply in restricting the
construction of residential dwellings in the municipality.
Open space and affordable housing index (OSAHI): The OSAHI is the sum of two
dummy variables. The first variable takes the value of one if a developer has to include
affordable housing to build large area developments (Question 7 item (b) iii.). The sec-
ond variable takes the value of one if a developer has to supply mandatory open space
requirements to build large area developments (Question 7 item (b) iv.).
Cost index (CI): Another important facet of local land use regulations is the costs
concerning development. Developers have to pay for the building permit and allocable
share of the expenses of infrastructure improvement. The CI comprises two components.
The first component uses the answers to question 9, which asks how high the building
permit costs are in the municipality. The second component relies on the answers to a
set of questions about the fees concerning development. Question 5 items (d), (e), (k)
ask the importance of new infrastructure costs, fees and duties, and capital gain tax for
the regulation of residential dwellings in the municipality. Question 7 items (a) iii. ask
if developers have to pay allocable share of costs of infrastructure improvements to build
single and multi-family dwellings. Question 7 items (b) v. ask if developers have to pay
allocable share of costs of infrastructure improvements to build large area developments.
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2.3. Outcomes of regulation process and rules
The third category focuses on the outcome of the regulation process and rules. It
quantifies, e.g., how easy it is and how long it takes to get a building permit. This
category comprises the following index.
Outcome index (OI): The OI builds on the answers to the following questions. Ques-
tion 5 item (j) asks the importance of the duration of the review process for building
permits for the regulation of residential dwellings in the municipality. Question 16 asks
how long does a building permit procedure for single-family and multi-family dwellings
currently take.
2.4. CRED Ease of Residential Development Index (CERDI)
To aggregate the ten sub-indices, we use the following two methods. In the first,
we take the simple mean of the ten sub-indices and denote the Mean Index Yi. In
the second, we use factor analysis. Specifically, we use the first principal-component
factor from each sub-index to construct the aggregate index. We denote the Factor
Analysis Index Fi. Factor analysis ensures that the variation of the ten sub-indices
does not reflect the variation in unobserved variables.7 Both methods capture the local
regulatory environment for each municipality in a single dimension.
To normalize the aggregate indices we employ three different approaches. First, fol-





where Y is the aggregate Mean Index in municipality i and Zi denotes the standardized
index. Note that Zi has a sample mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Second, we perform a min-max normalisation following Marchante and Ortega (2006)





where Mi denotes the min-max index and takes a maximum value of one and a minimum
value of zero.
7The factor loadings for the sub-indices are: CII=0.69; MII=0.67; CAII=0.26; OII=0.79; PAI=0.61;
EMRI=0.01; DRI=0.06; OSAHI=0.29; CI=0.10; OI=0.11.
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Third, we compute a min-max normalization based on the type of municipality. Using
the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) spatial regions (“Raumregionen”) definition,





The type of municipality is indicated by p and Ti denotes the spatial region min-max
index. Like the previous normalization, this index takes a maximum value of one and
a minimum value of zero. This index ensures the comparability between different types
of municipalities. Note that for all indices a higher (lower) value implies more (less)
regulation. Due to its simplicity, we consider the Mean Index Yi our benchmark index.
3. Empirical framework
While the majority of municipalities responded to our survey, we still have many
non-responding municipalities for which cannot directly compute the CERDI. In order
to address the missing values we use the answers of our survey (see Appendix A.2)
in combination with detailed data about municipal characteristics such as information
about the local housing markets (rents, vacancy rates etc.), sociodemographics, political
majorities etc. and a machine learning method. This allows us to predict the CERDI for
the municipalities that did not respond to our survey. The main challenge of predicting
the CERDI is selecting the predictors, i.e., the determinants of land use regulation D
′
.
Including too many predictors leads to overfitting. In other words, the model provides
a good in-sample prediction (high R2), but a bad out-of-sample prediction. In contrast,
including too few predictors leads to omitted variable bias (Ahrens et al., 2020). This
challenge is augmented by the high-dimensional data and the collinearity of the predic-
tors. Thus, running an OLS model, including all the predictors, is incongruous for this
out-of-sample prediction. To solve this challenge, we rely on machine learning meth-
ods. Specifically we use the regularization methods lasso and square-root lasso.8 Like
OLS, the regularization methods minimize the residual sum of squares (RSS), but they
penalize some predictors towards zero. This reduces the variance, limiting the model
complexity, but at the cost of introducing some bias.
8Although there are numerous other regularization methods (see Ahrens et al., 2020 for an overview),
we focus on lasso and square-root because, in our case, they yield the best-performing predictions.
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The lasso estimator, developed by Frank and Friedman (1993) and Tibshirani (1996),
is given by the following equation:
















where the first term denotes the RSS. The second term denotes the penalty, where λ is
the overall penalty parameter and ψj are predictor-specific penalty loadings. Note that
if λ = 0 the model is exactly like an OLS model. In contrast, if λ → ∞ the model
is empty (all predictors are set to zero). Thus, lasso minimizes the RSS subject to a
constraint on the absolute size of coefficient estimates (l1-penalty) for given values of λ.
The square-root lasso, introduced by Belloni et al. (2011, 2014), is a modification of
the standard lasso. As can be seen in the following equation, it minimizes the square
root of RSS instead of the RSS:













The advantages over the standard lasso are that it is theoretically grounded, and the
data-driven optimal λ is independent of the unknown error variance under homoskedas-
ticity (Ahrens et al., 2020). However, it is computationally expensive. We predict the
CERDI for the non-responding municipalities by training our models using the CERDI
of the participating municipalities.
We use cross-validation for our benchmark model. I.e., we iteratively split the data in
training and validation sample and select the λ that minimizes the estimate of the out-
of-sample prediction error. In our case, the cross-validation runs through ten iterations.
To run our predictions, we use the Stata command cvlasso developed by Ahrens et al.
(2018, 2020).
The main advantage of regularized regressions is that they perform better in pre-
dictions with high dimensional data. They also lead to a sparser model that is more
straightforward and easy to interpret. By standardizing the dependent variable and pre-
dictors prior to estimation and returning coefficients in standard deviation units, we can
rank the determinants by their relative importance for predicting land use regulation.
However, regularized regressions’ estimates cannot be interpreted causally, and statisti-
cal inference on the coefficients is complex. These regressions do not necessarily choose
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the true predictors, but variables that are correlated to them. Regularized regressions
may select the true model with a large sample size, but this is only true under strong
assumptions.9 Nevertheless, the selected determinants serve as useful indicators of what
drives land use regulation, and they enable a simple comparison between municipalities.
4. Data
4.1. Land use regulation data
Regulatory constraints limit housing development. In this section, we describe the
available data on the extensive margin regulatory constraints which complements our
survey information. Table 1 summarizes the data sources, definitions, and importance
of these data sets.
Table 1: Data on extensive regulatory constraints
Data Description Area share of
Switzerland
Source
Crop rotation areas Areas best suited
for agriculture
12.3% Cantonal offices for
spatial development


















towns, and sites created
by the emergence of
industrialisation







2.8% Federal Office for the
Environment (FOEN)
Notes: Regulations on the extensive margin are not mutually exclusive. Overall, these protected areas
cover approximately 60 percent of the Swiss territory.
Regulations on the extensive margin include crop rotation areas, forests, high amenity
value areas, and UNESCO cultural and natural heritage sites, as illustrated in Table 1.
9See Hastie et al. (2015) for a detailed explanation on the mechanics of regularized regressions.
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Figures 1 and 2 show the spatial extent of these restrictions. Note that in general,
regulations on the extensive margin are not mutually exclusive. For example, the UN-
ESCO classification of an area of particular natural value might partly overlap with the
boundary of a regional park.
Figure 1: Forests and crop rotation areas
Notes: Forests and crop rotation areas may overlap due to imprecision of the FFF data. In total only
1.2% of the forest area overlaps with the FFF.
Crop Rotation Areas (FFF, Fruchtfolgeflächen) are plots of land best suited for agri-
culture use. These areas comprise approximately 4,400 km2 of cultivable land. Their
purpose – as stipulated by the Swiss Federal Law on Spatial Planning (Bundesgesetz
über die Raumplanung) from 1979 – is to secure nutrition in Switzerland in the long run
in case of emergency. In 1992, the Swiss Federal Council fixed the minimal amount of
FFF for each canton according to stringent soil quality criteria relating to the physical
and biological properties, such as soil texture, arable suitability, pollutant load, and the
shape of the land parcel. For example, alpine cantons having high shares of unproduc-
tive surfaces typically have smaller FFFs. Cantons were then responsible for defining
the precise location of FFFs within their boundaries. Since FFFs are allocated for agri-
cultural use, they must not be developed. Cantons can make exceptions in this regard
provided that the municipality in which the FFF is located manages to replace it with
12
an equivalent plot of land fulfilling soil quality criteria. Given the stringency of such
rules, developers rarely employ this burdensome process.
Figure 2: UNESCO, BLN, and Parks
Notes: With the exception of lakes, colored areas correspond to extensive margin regulations. They
may overlap
In response to industrialization in Europe and Switzerland, in 1876, Switzerland
passed a law prohibiting further deforestation, de facto freezing forest areas to the level
observed at that time. The law has remained mainly unchanged to the present day.10
As a result of these laws, the forest area in the highly populated regions has remained
practically unchanged since 1876.
The Federal Inventory of Landscapes and Natural History (BLN, Bundesinventar der
Landschaften und Naturdenkmäler) classifies the most typical and most valuable land-
scapes in Switzerland. The aim of the inventory – which was progressively introduced
from 1977 to 1998 – is to protect Switzerland’s scenic diversity and to ensure that the
10The law was revised in 1991 as part of the Federal Act on Forestry (Bundesgesetz über den Wald).
The revision introduced minor exceptions allowing development. For example, buildings with public
utility – such as rangers’ cabins – can be built within forest areas. However, the construction of such
buildings is very infrequent because i) the federal government very rarely grants building permits and
ii) cleared forest areas must be replaced with new equally sized plots of land.
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distinctive features of these landscapes are preserved.
Parks of national importance are characterized by beautiful landscapes, rich biodi-
versity, and high-quality cultural assets. The communities and cantons preserve these
values and ensure their sustainment for the economic and social development of their
regions.
One of the objectives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) is to protect the cultural and natural heritage of outstanding
universal value. Currently, UNESCO recognizes 981 cultural or natural heritage sites
worldwide, 11 of which are located in Switzerland. These areas mostly consist of build-
ings of particular architectural interest, historic towns, and areas with valuable natural
amenities. Overall, areas protected by FFF, forest, UNESCO, regional and national
parks or BLN regulations cover approximately 60 percent of the Swiss territory (see
Figures 1 and 2).
4.2. Determinants, housing, and external validation data
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis.
To check the determinants of land use regulation, we gathered data on the municipal-
ities’s density, amenities, and socio-demographic factors from the Swiss Federal Statis-
tical Office (FSO). The Federal Register of Buildings and Habitations published by the
FSO provides a census of the residential housing stock of the country. To compute the
quality-adjusted house prices and capitalization rates in 2015, we use geo-referenced data
on advertised residential properties provided by Meta-Sys. The data contains more than
200,000 postings of rental properties and more than 70,000 million postings of selling
residences for the whole of Switzerland for 2015.
For external validity, we use the Documedia data to compute building refusal rates
at the municipality level. We define the building refusal rate as the number of refused
buildings and renovation permits divided by their total number. It reflects the effective
restrictiveness of local governments regarding residential development. The change in
duration from the application to the approval of a development stem from question 15
(a) from our survey (see Appendix A.2). The price and rent housing supply elasticities
stem from Buechler et al. (2019).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
mean min max sd
Density 434.77 0.86 12810.99 788.18
Density 1919 29.70 0.12 1441.33 60.04
Av. no. of floors 0.69 0.01 4.10 0.44
Dist. lakes 15.99 0.01 103.08 14.38
SE plot 0.27 0.00 0.98 0.18
Ruggedness 0.15 0.00 0.93 0.17
Culture 0.01 0.00 0.30 0.02
Income 36.24 10.75 329.28 13.70
Agriculture 0.24 0.00 2.72 0.28
Industry 0.42 0.00 26.37 0.98
Tax rate s. 80 0.14 0.05 0.19 0.02
Right 0.53 0.00 0.90 0.12
Center 0.24 0.00 0.87 0.13
Left 0.22 0.00 0.58 0.10
House price 8.61 7.22 9.54 0.33
Cap rates 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.01
Own rate 0.51 0.00 0.93 0.11
Vac. rate 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.02
Refusal rate 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.14
Approval durantion 3.05 0.00 5.00 1.10
Price elasticity 0.51 0.25 0.52 0.01
Rent elasticity 3.18 0.65 3.25 0.15
Notes: Density denotes residents per square kilometer of area in 2019. Density 1919 denotes flats
per square kilometer of area in 1919. Av. no. of floors denotes the average number of floors in the
municipality’s residential buildings in 2015. The ground floor counts as 0. Dist. lakes denotes the
distance to the nearest lake in km. SE plot denotes the share of 100×100 meters plots facing south-
east. Ruggedness denotes the elevation standard deviation. sd=standard deviation. Culture denotes
the share employed in the creative and cultural sector in 2018. Income denotes the average income in
1000 CHF per person in 2019. Agriculture and Industry denote the share employed in the agricultural
and industrial sector in 2018, respectively. Tax rate s. 80 denotes the tax rate for single with a taxable
income of 80,000 in 2019. Right, Center, and Left denote the share who voted for right, center, and left-
wing parties in the 2015 Swiss national elections, respectively. House price denotes house prices that
are quality-adjusted for the living surface, the number of rooms, age, age squared, and building type.
Cap rates denotes quality-adjusted capitalization rates in 2015. Own rate denotes the homeownership
rate in 2015. Vac. rate denotes the vacancy rate in 2019. Refusal rate denotes the refusal rates for
new building permits in 2015. Approval duration is a categorical variable that stems from question
15 (a) from our survey (see Appendix A.2) denoting the change in duration from the application to
the approval of a development. Price elasticity and Rent elasticity denote the price and rent housing
supply elasticities for Swiss municipalities, respectively.
5. Results
5.1. Final indices
Table 3 summarizes our final indices, and Figure 3 depicts the CERDI Mean Index
(for all municipalities that responded to our survey) and the predicted Mean Index.
Note that we predict the Mean Index for non-responding municipalities using our ML
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models described in Sections 3 and 5.7.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics final indices
mean min max sd
Yi 47.90 19.12 70.25 6.75
Fi 0.00 -2.82 3.39 1.00
Zi 0.00 -4.26 3.31 1.00
Mi 0.56 0.00 1.00 0.13
Ti 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.17
Notes: Yi = Mean Index, Fi = Factor Analysis Index, Zi = Standardized Index, Mi = Min-max Index,
Ti = Min-max by municipality types (urban, periphery, and rural) Index. sd=standard deviation. The
indices are based on 715 municipalities.
Figure 3: Ease of residential development across Swiss Municipalities
Panel A: Mean Index Yi Panel B: Predicted Mean Index Yi
Notes: Panel A shows the Mean Index Yi for the 715 municipalities that responded to our survey (see
Appendix A.2). Panel B shows the predicted Mean Index Yi. To predict this index, we use a ML
model (see Sections 3 and 5.7).
5.2. Indices correlation
To determine if a restrictive municipality is restrictive in all dimensions, we com-
pute the indices’ correlation. Table 4 shows the results. Predictably, the aggregate
Mean Index Yi has a strong and significant correlation with all the sub-indices. The
four sub-indices capturing the land use regulation process (CII, MII, CAII, and OII)
have a strong and positive correlation, whereby the weakest correlation is always with
the CAII. The reason is that the CAII only varies at the cantonal level. Municipalities
with a strong citizen’s involvement in the regulatory process also feature strong mu-
nicipality and organizations’ involvement and, to a lesser extent, cantonal involvement.
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Moreover, the strong correlation of CII, MII, and OII, with the remaining sub-indices,
except EMRI, show that municipalities with a more regulated land use process also have
stricter regulatory rules that lead to longer durations of the review process for building
permits. Interestingly, the degree of citizen involvement (CII) is not strongly correlated
with density restrictions (DRI) and extensive margin regulations (EMRI). More citizen
involvement clearly correlates with a higher cost index (CI) and a longer process accord-
ing to higher values of OI. The same holds true for the involvement of other stakeholdes
as captured in OII. The sub-indices capturing the rules of regulatory constraints (PAI,
DRI, EMRI, OSAHI) also have a strong and positive correlation, except for EMRI. Since
EMRI measures the protection of areas from development, like forests, and the Federal
government determines this type of regulation, it does not seem to influence the munic-
ipalities’ land use regulation process and rules much. Finally, the sub-index OI, which
captures the regulation process and rules outcomes, has a strong and positive correlation
with most other sub-indices. The exceptions are the EMRI and the OSAHI. The reason
is that open space and affordable housing requirements captured by the OSAHI only
matters for big urban municipalities.
Table 4: Correlation indices
fi CII MII CAII OII PAI DRI EMRI OSAHI CI OI
Yi 1.00
CII 0.57∗∗∗ 1.00
MII 0.55∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 1.00
CAII 0.09∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 1.00
OII 0.55∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 1.00
PAI 0.58∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 1.00
DRI 0.46∗∗∗ 0.05 0.18∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ 0.02 0.16∗∗∗ 1.00
EMRI 0.23∗∗∗ 0.04 -0.09∗∗ -0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.02 1.00
OSAHI 0.36∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗ 1.00
CI 0.47∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ -0.00 0.16∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ -0.06∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 1.00
OI 0.43∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.01 0.27∗∗∗ 1.00
Notes: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. The indices are based on 715 municipalities. Land use
regulation process: Citizens involvement index (CII), Municipality involvement index (MII); Cantonal
involvement index (CAII); Organizations involvement index (OII). Rules of regulatory constraints:
Project approval index (PAI); Density restrictions index (DRI); Extensive margin regulation index
(EMRI); Open space and affordable housing index (OSAHI); Cost index (CI). Outcomes of regulation
process and rules: Outcome index (OI)
5.3. Variance decomposition
To discern how much of the aggregate indices’ variance is contributed by each sub-
index, we perform a Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition.11 We compute this decomposi-
tion by regressing the aggregate final indices (Mean Index, Standardized Index, Min-max
11See Shorrocks (1982) and Shorrocks (2013) for further details.
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Index, and Min-max by municipality types Index) on all their respective possible combi-
nations of sub-indices and obtain the corresponding R2 for each combination. For each
sub-index, we then calculate the R2’s average improvement when adding that sub-index
as a covariate to the regression. We interpret this average improvement as the sub-
indexes relative importance to explain the variation in the aggregate indices. Table 5
shows the results. Note that the relative importances add to one.
Table 5: Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yi Zi Mi Ti
Index Relative importance
CII 0.1291 0.1374 0.1295 0.1414
PAI 0.1328 0.1414 0.1332 0.1255
MII 0.1188 0.1265 0.1192 0.1286
DRI 0.1145 0.1219 0.1149 0.0807
OII 0.1127 0.1200 0.1130 0.0671
CI 0.0899 0.0957 0.0901 0.0820
OI 0.0876 0.0933 0.0879 0.1252
EMRI 0.0781 0.0832 0.0783 0.0907
OSAHI 0.0693 0.0738 0.0695 0.0514
CAII 0.0063 0.0067 0.0063 0.0181
Notes: Yi = Mean Index, Zi = Standardized Index, Mi = Min-max Index, Ti = Min-max by municipality
types (urban, periphery, and rural) Index. The indices are based on 715 municipalities. Land use
regulation process: Citizens involvement index (CII), Municipality involvement index (MII); Cantonal
involvement index (CAII); Organizations involvement index (OII). Rules of regulatory constraints:
Project approval index (PAI); Density restrictions index (DRI); Extensive margin regulation index
(EMRI); Open space and affordable housing index (OSAHI); Cost index (CI). Outcomes of regulation
process and rules: Outcome index (OI)
Our results reveal that for the aggregate indices in columns (1) to (3) (Mean Index,
Standardized Index, and Min-max Index), the sub-index PAI is the most important.
It explains 13-14% of the overall variation. Most sub-indices related to the land use
regulation process (CII, MII, and OII) are relatively important. This underscores the
weight that citizen, municipal, and organizations’ involvement have on regulation. One
exception is the CAII which only differs at the cantonal level. This sub-index has the
lowest importance for all aggregate indices. For the Min-max by municipality types
Index (column(4)), the most important sub-index is the CII, followed by the PAI and
OI. When considering the types of municipality, outcomes of regulation process and rules
become more important in explaining the overall variation in regulation. It is noteworthy
that the relative importance is well distributed among the sub-indices. No sub-index
has a relative importance above 15% and lower than 5%, except for CAII. This shows
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that the aggregate indices do a remarkable job capturing the different aspects of land
use restrictiveness across municipalities.
5.4. Determinants of land use regulation
Table 6: Determinants of land use regulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS
Log Mean Index Yi
Density 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗









Ruggedness 0.082∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.113∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.128∗∗
(0.044) (0.059) (0.059) (0.064) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058)
French 0.028∗ 0.029 0.025 0.031 0.029 0.026 0.029
(0.017) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Italian 0.055∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.144∗∗ 0.142∗∗
(0.021) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Rhaeto-Romanic 0.014 0.042 0.031 0.042 0.040 0.041 0.038
(0.049) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Right -0.082 -0.128 -0.156 -0.113 -0.129 -0.125 -0.128
(0.078) (0.095) (0.098) (0.102) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096)
Center -0.003 -0.045 -0.056 -0.029 -0.043 -0.051 -0.044
(0.076) (0.105) (0.110) (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
Canton FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 705 705 705 705 705 705 705
R-squared 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. The units of
observations are Swiss municipalities. The Mean Index Yi is based on 715 municipalities. Density
denotes log residents per square kilometer of area in 2019. Density 1919 denotes log flats per square
kilometer of area in 1919. Dist. lakes denotes the log distance to the nearest lake in km. SE plot
denotes the share of 100×100 meters plots facing south-east. Income denotes the average log income
per person in 2019. Ruggedness denotes the elevation standard deviation. French, Italian, and Rhaeto-
Romanic are dummy variables indicating the predominant spoken language in the municipality. Right
and Center denote the share who voted for right-wing and center parties in the 2015 Swiss national
elections, respectively. In column (4) Density is instrumented with Density 1919. The corresponding
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is 366.
The literature has discussed several mechanisms that contribute to stricter land-use
regulation such as NIMBYism or density or the local composition of the jurisdictions
population. In the following we analyze the determinants of land use regulation and
test the hypotheses put forward in the literature. In particular, we regress variables
encompassing the municipality type, sociodemographics, the economy, and geography
on our Mean Index Yi. Table 6 shows the results.
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In line with the literature, denser places display higher land use regulation. However,
the magnitude of the effect is rather small. As is shown in columns (1) and (2), a 10%
increase in density is associated with approximately 0.2% stricter regulation. Interest-
ingly, land use restrictiveness is already explained by the historical density, measured
as flats per square kilometer of area in 1919 (see column (3)). Running a two-stage
least squares (2SLS) regression instrumenting density with historical density confirms
this result (see column (4)). Favorable amenities, like closeness to lakes or south-east
facing plots, lead to stricter land use regulation. In contrast to the literature, the res-
ident’s average income does not affect land use regulation in Switzerland. Our results
also show that more rugged municipalities and municipalities that predominantly speak
Italian and French are more regulated. Moreover, a center-right political inclination is
associated with lower land use regulation, although the coefficients are not significant.
Overall, there seems to be a large share of variation in land use regulation that remains
unexplained by the conventional determinants put forward in the literature.
5.5. Correlation with housing market equilibrium variables
To check land use regulation’s impact on the housing market we regress our Mean
Index Yi on housing market equilibrium variables. Of course, these variables are endoge-
nous. Therefore the results shown in Table 7 can only be interpreted as correlations.
Land use regulation is highly positively correlated with house prices. Albeit, the causal-
ity is probably reversed, i.e., stricter land use regulation leads to higher house prices.
Since land use regulation is negatively correlated with capitalization rates, stricter land
use regulations correlates positively with higher increase in house prices than rents.
Contrary to findings in the previous literature, the ownership rate has a negative im-
pact on land use regulation. This may be a Swiss phenomenon where homeownership is
much lower than in other countries. As expected, the correlation with vacancy rates is
negative.
5.6. External validation
We regress our Mean Index Yi on the refusal rates of new building permits, changes
in the building permit approval duration, and housing price and rent supply elasticities
for external validity. Table 8 shows the results. Reassuringly, our indices show a positive
and significant correlation with the refusal rates and approval duration. As shown in
column (1), a 10% increase in regulation translates into a 0.8 percentage point increase
in the refusal rate. We also check our Mean Index’s effect on the Swiss housing supply
elasticities provided by Buechler et al. (2019). Our indices correlate negatively with both
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Table 7: Correlation with housing market equilibrium variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)









Density 0.012∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ruggedness 0.121∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.101∗ 0.123∗∗
(0.059) (0.063) (0.058) (0.059)
French 0.027 0.017 0.029 0.037
(0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028)
Italian 0.169∗∗ 0.112 0.150∗∗ 0.136∗∗
(0.066) (0.076) (0.061) (0.062)
Rhaeto-Romanic 0.046 0.027 0.040 0.041
(0.056) (0.061) (0.058) (0.057)
Right -0.171∗ -0.143 -0.121 -0.119
(0.096) (0.103) (0.095) (0.094)
Center -0.035 -0.020 -0.028 -0.039
(0.103) (0.114) (0.106) (0.105)
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 695 663 705 705
R-squared 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.12
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. The units of
observations are Swiss municipalities. The Mean Index Yi is based on 715 municipalities. House price
denotes log house prices that are quality-adjusted for the living surface, the number of rooms, age,
age squared, and building type for 2015. Cap rates denotes quality-adjusted capitalization rates in
2015. Own rate denotes the homeownership rate in 2015. Vac. rate denotes the vacancy rate in
2019. Density denotes log residents per square kilometer of area in 2019. Ruggedness denotes the
elevation standard deviation. French, Italian, and Rhaeto-Romanic are dummy variables indicating the
predominant spoken language in the municipality. Right and Center denote the share who voted for
right-wing and center parties in the 2015 Swiss national elections, respectively.
price and rental housing supply elasticities. Note that the effect seems to be larger on
the rental (column (4)) compared to price (column (3)) housing supply elasticities. In
line with previous literature, we underscore the negative impact of land use regulation
on housing supply. These results show that our indices do a fine job capturing the ease
of development at the municipality level.
5.7. Machine learning results
To predict our final aggregate indices for non-responding municipalities, we apply
a ML cross-validation model (see Section 3 for more details). We feed the model with
the above variables about determinants and housing market characteristics as well as
21
Table 8: External validation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Refusal rate Approval duration Price elasticitiy Rent elasticitiy
Log Yi 0.080
∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.302) (0.008) (0.023)
Obs. 689 715 706 706
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. The units of obser-
vations are Swiss municipalities. Refusal rate for new building permits are computed with Documedia
2015 data. Change in duration from the application to the approval of a development stems from ques-
tion 15 (a) from our survey (see Appendix A.2). Price and rent housing supply elasticities are from
Buechler et al. (2019). The Mean Index Yi is based on 715 municipalities.
some additional variables which may help to explain the variation.12 encompassing the
municipality type, sociodemographics, the housing market, the economy, and geogra-
phy and let it choose the best land use regulation predictors. Since we standardize the
dependent variable and predictors prior to estimation, Table 9 shows the land use reg-
ulation predictors in standard deviation units. This allows us to rank them by their
relative importance. For most final indices, vacancy rates are the most important pre-
dictor, followed by share employed in industry, and capitalization rates. The variable
capturing the average numbers of floors, a proxy for density, is also among the top pre-
dictors. Interestingly, the ML model shows that higher tax rates are associated with
higher land use regulation. The model also underpins the importance of amenities and
socio-demographic factors as drivers of land-use regulation.
6. Conclusion
The local regulatory environment is of crucial importance for land use and housing
supply. Sharply rising real estate prices call for increasing supply and revision of reg-
ulation in many areas. Simultaneously, concerns about the way we use our land space
and its impacts on environmental conditions often demand stricter regulation. In many
12These variables are: Density; density 1919; average number of floors in themunicipality’s residential
buildings; municipality type dummy (urban, periphery, and rural); language dummy (German, French,
Italian, and Rhaeto-Romanic); share who voted for right, center, and left wing parties; share employed
in the creative and cultural sector; share of foreigners, hedonic house prices, rents, and capitalization
rates; ownership rate; vacancy rate; average household size living in the municipality; share employed
in the agricultural, industrial, and service sector; tax rate for single/married with a taxable income
of 80,000/150,000 CHF; average income; distance to lake in km; share of 100×100 meters plots facing
south-east; mean municipality elevation, municipality elevation standard deviation; canton fixed effects.
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Table 9: CV-lasso results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Yi Fi Zi Mi Ti
Urban 0.0404 0.0825 0.0404 0.0404
Av. no. of floors 0.0510 0.1148 0.0510 0.0510
SE plot 0.0260 0.0260 0.0260 0.0334
Culture 0.0309 0.0338 0.0309 0.0309
Agriculture 0.0619
Industry 0.0758 0.0209 0.0758 0.0758 0.0420
Tax rate s. 80 0.0325 0.0325 0.0325 0.0438
Italian 0.0346 0.0506 0.0346 0.0346 0.0468
Rhaeto-Romanic -0.0095




Cap rates -0.0679 -0.0104 -0.0679 -0.0679 -0.0629
Own rate -0.0526 -0.0018 -0.0526 -0.0526
Vac. rate -0.0812 -0.0282 -0.0812 -0.0812 -0.0906
Lambda 26.86 25.69 26.86 26.86 29.98
Observations 661 645 661 661 661
Notes: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. The units of observations are Swiss municipalities. Yi =
Mean Index, Fi = Factor Analysis Index, Zi = Standardized Index, Mi = Min-max Index, Ti = Min-max
by municipality types (urban, periphery, and rural) Index. The indices are based on 715 municipalities.
Urban is a dummy variable indicating if a municipality is urban. Av. no. of floors denotes the average
number of floors in the municipality’s residential buildings in 2015. The ground floor counts as 0. SE
plot denotes the share of 100×100 meters plots facing south-east. Culture denotes the share employed
in the creative and cultural sector in 2018. Agriculture and Industry denote the share employed in the
agricultural and industrial sector in 2018, respectively. Tax rate s. 80 denotes the tax rate for single
with a taxable income of 80000 in 2019. Italian and Rhaeto-Romanic are dummy variables indicating
the predominant spoken language in the municipality. Right, Center, and Left denote the share who
voted for right, center, and left-wing parties in the 2015 Swiss national elections, respectively. House
price denotes log house prices that are quality-adjusted for the living surface, the number of rooms,
age, age squared, and building type in 2015. Cap rates denotes quality-adjusted capitalization rates in
2015. Own rate denotes the homeownership rate in 2015. Vac. rate denotes the vacancy rate in 2019.
Following Canton fixed effects enter positively (+) or negatively (-) in our ML model: BE (+), LU (+),
SZ (+), OW (+), NW (+), ZG (-), SO (-), BS (+), BL (+), SH (-), AI (-), SG (+), GR (-), TG (+),
VD (-), VS (-), NE (+), GE (+), JU (+).
countries, local authorities have a high degree of autonomy about land use regulations,
and the instruments used vary significantly across regions. This makes a systematic
measure of regulatory constraints fundamental. We conducted a survey to construct
such a measure along several dimensions capturing the ‘ease of local residential develop-
ment’. Our results show a large degree of variation in land use regulation and provide
first insights into regulatory stringency determinants. We find the historical develop-
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ment, natural amenities, cultural dimensions, and political aspects impact local land use
regulation’s stringency.
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Appendix A. Survey
Appendix A.1. Survey methodology
Appendix A.2. Survey (English)
1. In your municipality, how involved are the following organizations/stakeholders
in affecting residential spatial planning? Please rate the importance of each on a
scale from 1 to 5. (1 = not involved at all; 5 = very involved)
(a) Municipality executive body
(b) Municipality legislative body (community assembly or parliament)
(c) Municipal secretary
(d) Building commission
(e) Municipal administrative unit (e.g. local planning office)
(f) Inter-municipal administrative unit (e.g. inter-municipal planning office, re-
gional administrative unit)
(g) Cantonal administrative unit (e.g. cantonal planning office)




(l) Investors (e.g. pension funds)
(m) Voting citizens
2. Approximately how many people are involved in residential spatial planning pro-
cesses in your municipality?
3. How important is cooperation/coordination with the following organizations/stakeholders
for spatial planning regarding residential building in your municipality? Please rate
the importance of each on a scale from 1 to 5. (1 = not important at all; 5 = very
important)
(a) Municipalities in the same canton





(f) Others (Please specify which ones. E.g. neighborhood organizations, political
parties, etc.)
4. In your municipality, to what extent are the following organizations typically in-
volved in approving a new construction project (which does not need rezoning)?
Please rate the involvement of each on a scale from 1 to 5. (1 = not involved at
all; 5 = very involved)
(a) Municipality executive body
(b) Municipality legislative body (community assembly or parliament)
(c) Municipal administrative unit (e.g. local planning office)
(d) Inter-municipal administrative unit (e.g. inter-municipal planning office, re-
gional administrative unit)
(e) Cantonal administrative unit (e.g. cantonal planning office)
(f) Environmental examining board
(g) Monument protection authority




(l) Investors (e.g. pension funds)
(m) Voting citizens
5. How restrictive are the following factors for building residential dwellings in your
municipality? Please rate the restrictiveness of each on a scale from 1 to 5. (1 =
not restrictive at all; 5 = very restrictive)
(a) Supply of land
(b) Density restrictions (e.g. height restrictions, number of floors, floor area ratio,
and boundary limit distances)
(c) Minimal density requirements
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(d) New infrastructure costs (e.g. infrastructure access costs)
(e) Fees/duties
(f) Noise regulations
(g) Municipality executive body opposition to growth (e.g. due to crowded
schools)
(h) Citizen opposition to urban sprawl
(i) Monument protection
(j) Duration of the review process for building permits
(k) Capital gain tax
6. Which of the following density restrictions are relevant in your municipality?
(a) Height restrictions and boundary limit distances
(b) Floor area ratio
(c) Green space requirements
7. In your municipality, do developers typically have to meet the following require-
ments to be able to build? (Yes or no)
(a) For single and multi-family dwellings:
i. Meet minimum lot size (e.g. 1000 square meters) requirements
ii. Floor to area ratios requirements
iii. Pay allocable share of costs of infrastructure improvement
(b) For large area developments (when negotiations with the developers take
place):
0. Not applicable to our municipality
i. Meet minimum lot size (e.g. 1000 square meters) requirements
ii. Floor to area ratios requirements
iii. Include affordable housing (however defined)
iv. Supply mandatory open space
v. Pay allocable share of costs of infrastructure improvement
8. In your municipality, how does the supply of zoned land compare to the demand
for the following land uses? (Far more than required; More than required; Roughly






9. Approximately how high are the building permit costs (for applicants), including
cantonal fees and excluding connection costs, in your municipality for the following
properties:
(a) 1 apartment building with 15 apartments: Construction price CHF 5‘000‘000.-
5‘460m3, 1‘175m2 living space
(b) 1 apartment building with 5 apartments: Construction price CHF 2‘000‘000.-
2‘160m3, 460m2 living space
(c) 1 single-family house: Construction price CHF 700‘000.-, 750m3, 150m2 living
space
10. Approximately how many residential building permit applications did your munic-
ipality receive in the year 2019?
11. Approximately against how many residential building permit applications did your
municipality receive objections in the year 2019?
12. In the last 10 years, how much have the building permit fees changed in your
municipality? (<0%, 0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, ¿50%)
13. In the last 10 years, how much have the costs of a single-family house changed in
your municipality? (<0%, 0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, ¿50%)
14. In the last 10 years, how much have the costs of an apartment changed in your
municipality? (<0%, 0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, ¿50%)
15. In the last 10 year, how has the duration from the application to the approval
of a development changed in your municipality (if the documents were entered
correctly and completely)? (Considerably shorter; A little shorter; No change; A




16. In your municipality, how long does a building permit procedure for the following




17. Does your municipality accept digital building permit applications? (Yes or no)
18. How important are the special plans for land use for spatial planning in your
municipality? Please rate the importance of each on a scale from 1 to 5. (1 = not
important at all; 5 = very important)
19. Do the following sociodemographic factors influence residential spatial planning in
your municipality?
(a) Age




20. Which of the following spatial planning strategies best applies to your municipal-
ity?
(a) Passive: Tendency to have little intervention and control.
(b) Proactive: based on growth.
(c) Reactive: intervention and cooperation if necessary.
Appendix A.3. Survey (German)
1. Wie stark sind die folgenden Organisationen in Ihrer Gemeinde an der Wohnraum-
planung beteiligt? Bitte bewerten Sie die Wichtigkeit auf einer Skala von 1 bis 5.
(1 = überhaupt nicht beteiligt; 5 = sehr beteiligt)
(a) Exekutivorgan der Gemeinde




(e) Kommunale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. Bauamt)
(f) Interkommunale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. interkommunales Bauamt, regionale
Verwaltungseinheit, Regierungsstatthalteramt)





(l) Investoren (z.B. Pensionskassen)
(m) Die StimmbürgerInnen
2. Wie viele Personen ungefähr sind in Ihrer Gemeinde an der Wohnraumplanung
beteiligt?
3. Wie wichtig ist die Kooperation/Koordination mit den folgenden Organisationen
für die Wohnraumplanung in Ihrer Gemeinde? Bitte bewerten Sie die Wichtigkeit
auf einer Skala von 1 bis 5. (1 = überhaupt nicht wichtig; 5 = sehr wichtig)
(a) Gemeinden im selben Kanton




(f) Andere (Bitte geben Sie an, welche. Z.B. Quartierorganisationen, Parteien
usw.)
4. Wie stark sind die folgenden Organisationen typischerweise beteiligt, um ein neues
Bauprojekt (für das keine Umzonung erforderlich ist) in Ihrer Gemeinde zu genehmi-
gen? Bitte bewerten Sie die Beteiligung auf einer Skala von 1 bis 5. (1 = überhaupt
nicht beteiligt; 5 = sehr beteiligt)
(a) Exekutivorgan der Gemeinde
(b) Legislativorgan der Gemeinde (Gemeindeversammlung oder -parlament)
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(c) Kommunale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. Bauamt)
(d) Interkommunale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. interkommunales Bauamt, regionale
Verwaltungseinheit, Regierungsstatthalteramt)







(l) Investoren (z.B. Pensionskassen)
(m) Die StimmbürgerInnen
5. Wie einschränkend sind die folgenden Faktoren für den Wohnungsbau in Ihrer
Gemeinde? Bitte bewerten Sie die Einschränkung auf einer Skala von 1 bis 5 (1 =
gar nicht einschränkend; 5 = sehr einschränkend).
(a) Landangebot
(b) Dichteeinschränkungen (z.B. Bauhöhe, Anzahl Stockwerke, Nutzungsziffer,
und Grenzabstände)
(c) Mindestdichteanforderungen
(d) Kosten für neue Infrastruktur (z.B. Erschliessungskosten)
(e) Gebühren/Abgaben
(f) Lärmvorschriften
(g) Widerstand des Gemeinderats gegen Wachstum (z.B. wegen überfüllter Schulen)
(h) Bürgeropposition gegen Zersiedlung
(i) Denkmalschutz
(j) Dauer des Überprüfungsverfahrens für Baugenehmigungen
(k) Mehrwertabgabe
6. Welche der folgenden Dichteeinschränkungen für den Wohnungsbau sind in Ihrer
Gemeinde relevant? (Wählen Sie alle relevanten Einschränkungen aus.)
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(a) Bauhöhe und Grenzabstände
(b) Nutzungsziffer
(c) Grünflächenanteil
7. Müssen BauherrenInnen typischerweise diese Anforderungen erfüllen, um in Ihrer
Gemeinde bauen zu können? (Ja oder nein)
(a) Für Ein- und Mehrfamilienhäuser:
i. Anforderung von Mindestgrundstückgrössen (z.B. 1‘000m2)
ii. Anforderung von Nutzungsziffern
iii. Anrechenbaren Anteil an die Kosten der Infrastrukturverbesserung zahlen
(b) Für grosse Arealentwicklungen (wenn Verhandlungen mit den BauherrInnen
stattfinden):
0. Für unsere Gemeinde nicht zutreffend
i. Anforderung von Mindestgrundstückgrössen (z.B. 1‘000m2)
ii. Anforderung von Nutzungsziffern
iii. Gemeinnützigen und preisgünstigen Wohnungsbau einbeziehen (wie auch
immer definiert)
iv. Obligatorische Freiflächen zur Verfügung stellen
v. Anrechenbaren Anteil an die Kosten der Infrastrukturverbesserung zahlen
8. Welches Angebot an Baufläche für die folgenden Landnutzungen besteht im Ver-
gleich zur Nachfrage in Ihrer Gemeinde? (Weit mehr als erforderlich; mehr als






9. Wie hoch sind ungefähr die Baubewilligungskosten (für die Gesuchsteller), inklu-
sive kantonale Gebühren und exklusive Anschlusskosten, in Ihrer Gemeinde für die
folgenden Immobilien:
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(a) 1 Mehrfamilienhaus mit 15 Wohnungen: Bausumme CHF 5‘000‘000.- 5‘460m3,
1‘175m2 Wohnfläche
(b) 1 Mehrfamilienhaus mit 5 Wohnungen: Bausumme CHF 2‘000‘000.- 2‘160m3,
460m2 Wohnfläche
(c) 1 Einfamilienhaus: Bausumme CHF 700‘000, 750m3, 150m2 Wohnfläche
10. Wie viele Wohnbaugesuche ungefähr sind im Jahr 2019 in Ihrer Gemeinde einge-
gangen?
11. Gegen wie viele Wohnbaugesuche ungefähr sind Einsprachen im Jahr 2019 in Ihrer
Gemeinde eingegangen?
12. Wie stark sind in Ihrer Gemeinde die Baugenehmigungskosten, in den letzten 10
Jahren, verändert? (<0%, 0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, >50%)
13. Wie stark sind in Ihrer Gemeinde die Kosten für Einfamilienhäuser, in den letzten
10 Jahren, verändert? (<0%, 0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, >50%)
14. Wie stark sind in Ihrer Gemeinde die Kosten für Stockwerkeigentum, in den letzten
10 Jahren, verändert? (<0%, 0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, >50%)
15. Wie hat sich in Ihrer Gemeinde die Dauer von der Eingabe bis zur Genehmigung
eines Wohnprojektes, in den letzten 10 Jahren, verändert? (Erheblich kürzer;
etwas kürzer; keine Änderung; etwas länger; erheblich länger)
(a) Einfamilienhaus
(b) Mehrfamilienhaus
16. Wie lange dauert derzeit ein Baubewilligungsverfahren in Ihrer Gemeinde (wenn
die Dokumente korrekt und vollständig eingegeben wurden)? (In Tagen)
(a) Einfamilienhaus
(b) Mehrfamilienhaus
17. Kann man in Ihrer Gemeinde die Baugesuche digital einreichen? (Ja oder nein)
18. Wie wichtig sind die Sondernutzungspläne für die Raumplanung in Ihrer Gemeinde?
Bitte bewerten Sie die Wichtigkeit auf einer Skala von 1 bis 5. (1 = überhaupt
nicht wichtig; 5 = sehr wichtig)
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19. Beinflussen die folgenden soziodemografischen Faktoren die Wohnraumplanung in
Ihrer Gemeinde?
(a) Alter




20. Welche der folgenden Raumplanungsstrategien trifft am ehesten auf Ihre Gemeinde
zu?
(a) Passiv: Tendenziell wenig Interventionen und Steuerung.
(b) Proaktiv: Basierend auf Wachstum.
(c) Reaktiv: Intervention und Kooperation wenn erforderlich.
Appendix A.4. Survey (French)
1. Dans quelle mesure les organisations suivantes participent-elles à l’aménagement
du territoire résidentiel dans votre commune? Veuillez évaluer l’importance de
chacune sur une échelle de 1 à 5. (1 = pas du tout impliqué ; 5 = très impliqué)
(a) Organe exécutif de la commune
(b) Organe législatif de la commune (assemblée ou parlement communal)
(c) Secrétaire communal
(d) Commission de la construction
(e) Unité administrative communale (par exemple, l’autorité de construction)
(f) Unité administrative intercommunale (par exemple, autorité intercommunale
de construction, unité administrative régionale d’urbanisme, préfecture)
(g) Unité administrative cantonale (par exemple, bureau cantonal de l’aménagement
du territoire)





(l) Investisseurs (par exemple, les caisses de pension)
(m) Les électeurs
2. Combien de personnes environ sont impliquées dans l’aménagement du territoire
résidentiel dans votre commune?
3. Quelle est l’importance de la coopération/coordination avec les organisations suiv-
antes pour l’aménagement du territoire en matière de construction résidentielle
dans votre commune? Veuillez évaluer l’importance de chacune sur une échelle de
1 à 5. (1 = pas important du tout ; 5 = très important)
(a) Communes du même canton




(f) Autres (veuillez préciser lesquels. Par exemple, les organisations de quartier,
les partis politiques, etc.)
4. Dans quelle mesure les organisations suivantes sont-elles généralement impliquées
dans l’approbation d’un projet de nouvelle construction (qui n’a pas besoin d’être
rezonée) dans votre commune? Veuillez évaluer la participation sur une échelle de
1 à 5. (1 = pas du tout impliqué ; 5 = très impliqué)
(a) Organe exécutif de la commune
(b) Organe législatif de la commune (assemblée ou parlement communal)
(c) Unité administrative communale (par exemple, l’autorité de construction)
(d) Unité administrative intercommunale (par exemple, autorité intercommunale
de construction, unité administrative régionale d’urbanisme, préfecture)
(e) Unité administrative cantonale (par exemple, bureau cantonal de l’aménagement
du territoire)
(f) Comité de vérification environnementale
(g) Protection des monuments historiques





(l) Investisseurs (par exemple, les caisses de pension)
(m) Les électeurs
5. Dans quelle mesure les facteurs suivants sont-ils restrictifs pour la construction de
logements résidentiels dans votre municipalité? Veuillez évaluer la restriction sur
une échelle de 1 à 5. (1 = pas du tout restrictif ; 5 = très restrictif).
(a) Offre de terrains
(b) Restrictions de densité (par exemple, restrictions de hauteur, nombre d’étages,
indice d’utilisation, distances limites)
(c) Exigences en matière de densité minimum
(d) Coûts des nouvelles infrastructures (par exemple, les coûts d’accès aux infras-
tructures)
(e) Frais/taxes
(f) Réglementation relative aux nuisances sonores
(g) Résistance du conseil communal à la croissance (par exemple en raison de la
surpopulation des écoles)
(h) L’opposition des citoyens à l’expansion urbaine
(i) Protection des monuments historiques
(j) Durée de la procédure de contrôle des permis de construire
(k) Taxe sur la plus-value
6. Laquelle des restrictions suivantes en matière de densité de logements dans votre
commune est applicable? (Choisissez toutes les restrictions qui sont applicables.)
(a) Restrictions de hauteur et distances limites
(b) Indice d’utilisation du sol
(c) Exigences en matière d’espaces verts
7. Pour construire dans votre commune, les constructeurs doivent-ils généralement
satisfaire aux exigences suivantes? (Oui ou non)
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(a) Pour les maisons individuelles et plurifamiliales:
i. Exigences de dimensions minimales des parcelles (par exemple 1’000m2)
ii. Exigences en matière d’indices d’utilisation
iii. Payment de la part imputable des coûts d’amélioration des infrastruc-
tures
(b) Pour les développements de grandes surfaces (lorsque des négociations avec
les constructeurs ont lieu):
0. Ne s’applique pas à notre commune.
i. Exigences de dimensions minimales des parcelles (par exemple 1’000m2)
ii. Exigences en matière d’indices d’utilisation
iii. Inclusion de logements d’utilité publique ou de logements à loyer ou à
prix modérés (quelle qu’en soit la définition)
iv. Mise à disposition des espaces ouverts obligatoires
v. Payment de la part imputable des coûts d’amélioration des infrastruc-
tures
8. Quelle est l’offre de terrains à bâtir pour les utilisations suivantes en comparai-
son avec la demande dans votre commune? (Beaucoup plus que nécessaire; plus






9. Quels sont les coûts approximatifs des permis de construire (pour le requérants),
y compris les taxes cantonales et hors frais de raccordement, dans votre commune
pour les immeubles suivants:
(a) 1 maison plurifamiliale avec 15 appartements: Coûts de construction CHF
5‘000‘000.-, 5‘460 m3, 1’175 m2 de surface habitable
(b) 1 maison plurifamiliale avec 5 appartements: Coûts de construction CHF
2‘000‘000.-, 2‘160m3, 460m2 de surface habitable
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(c) 1 maison individuelle: Coûts de construction CHF 700‘000.-, 750m3, 150m2
de surface habitable
10. Combien de demandes de permis de construire environ votre commune a-t-elle
reçues en 2019?
11. Combien de demandes de permis de construire ont été contestées dans votre com-
mune en 2019?
12. Au cours des dix dernières années, de combien les frais de permis de construire ont-
ils changé dans votre commune? (<0%, 0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%,
¿50%)
13. Au cours des dix dernières années, de combien les coûts d’une maison individuelle
ont-ils changé dans votre commune? (<0%, 0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-
50%, ¿50%)
14. Au cours des dix dernières années, de combien les coûts d’un appartement en
propriété ont-ils changé dans votre commune? (<0%, 0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%,
31-40%, 41-50%, ¿50%)
15. Au cours des dix dernières années, comment le délai entre la demande et l’approbation
d’un projet de logement a-t-il évolué dans votre commune? (Beaucoup plus court;
un peu plus court; pas de changement; un peu plus long; beaucoup plus long)
(a) Maison individuelle
(b) Maison plurifamiliale
16. Combien de temps prend actuellement une procédure de permis de construire dans




17. Votre commune accepte-t-elle les demandes de permis de construire sous forme
digitale? (Oui ou non)
18. Quelle est l’importance des plans d’affectation spéciaux pour l’aménagement du
territoire dans votre commune? Veuillez évaluer leur importance sur une échelle
de 1 à 5. (1 = pas du tout important; 5 = très important).
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19. Les facteurs sociodémographiques suivants influencent-ils l’aménagement du terri-
toire en matière de construction résidentielle dans votre commune?
(a) Âge
(b) Taille du ménage (par exemple, famille avec enfants)
(c) Revenus/actifs
(d) Autres
(e) N’est pas applicable
20. Laquelle des stratégies d’aménagement du territoire suivantes correspond le plus
à votre commune?
(a) Passif: Tendance de peu d’intervention et de contrôle.
(b) Proactif: basé sur la croissance.
(c) Réactif: intervention et coopération lorsque cela est nécessaire.
Appendix A.5. Survey (Italian)
1. Nel vostro comune, in che modo le seguenti organizzazioni sono coinvolte nella
pianificazione del territorio residenziale? Si prega di valutare l’importanza di cias-
cuna su una scala da 1 a 5. (1 = per niente coinvolti; 5 = molto coinvolti)
(a) Organo esecutivo del Comune
(b) Organo legislativo del Comune (assemblea comunale o parlamento)
(c) Segretario comunale
(d) Commissione edilizia
(e) Unità amministrativa comunale (ad es. autorità edilizia)
(f) Unità amministrativa intercomunale (ad es. autorità edilizia intercomunale,
unità amministrativa regionale, prefettura)
(g) Unità amministrativa cantonale (ad es. ufficio cantonale per la pianificazione
del territorio)
(h) Ufficio pianificazione esterna
(i) Cooperative
(j) Associazioni
(k) Proprietari di terreni
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(l) Investitori (ad es. fondi pensione)
(m) Gli elettori
2. Quante persone sono approssimativamente coinvolte nei processi di pianificazione
territoriale residenziale nel vostro comune?
3. Quanto è importante la cooperazione/il coordinamento con le seguenti organiz-
zazioni per la pianificazione territoriale in materia di edilizia residenziale nel vostro
comune? Si prega di valutare l’importanza di ciascuno su una scala da 1 a 5. (1
= per niente importante; 5 = molto importante)
(a) Comuni dello stesso cantone
(b) Comuni dei cantoni limitrofi
(c) Associazioni
(d) Proprietari di terreni
(e) Gli elettori
(f) Altri (si prega di specificare quali. Ad es. organizzazioni di quartiere, partiti
politici, ecc.)
4. Nel vostro comune, in che misura le seguenti organizzazioni sono tipicamente coin-
volte nell’approvazione di un nuovo progetto di costruzione (che non necessita di
rezonizzazione)? Si prega di valutare la partecipazione di ciascuna di esse su una
scala da 1 a 5. (1 = per niente coinvolta; 5 = molto coinvolta)
(a) Organo esecutivo del Comune
(b) Organo legislativo del Comune (assemblea comunale o parlamento)
(c) Unità amministrativa locale (ad es. autorità edilizia)
(d) Unità amministrativa intercomunale (ad es. autorità edilizia intercomunale,
unità amministrativa regionale, prefettura)
(e) Unità amministrativa cantonale (ad es. ufficio cantonale per la pianificazione
del territorio)
(f) Commissione di controllo ambientale





(k) Proprietari di terreni
(l) Investitori (ad es. fondi pensione)
(m) Gli elettori
5. Quanto sono restrittivi i seguenti fattori per la costruzione di abitazioni residenziali
nel vostro comune? Si prega di valutare la restrittività di ciascuno su una scala da
1 a 5. (1 = per niente restrittivo; 5 = molto restrittivo)
(a) Offerta del terreno
(b) Restrizioni di densità (ad es. restrizioni di altezza, numero di piani, indici di
utilizzazione e distanze limite)
(c) Requisiti di densità minima
(d) Costi per nuove infrastrutture (ad es. costi di accesso all’infrastruttura)
(e) Tasse/imposte
(f) Regolamentazione del rumore
(g) Resistenza del consiglio comunale alla crescita (ad es. a causa del sovraffol-
lamento delle scuole)
(h) L’opposizione dei cittadini all’espansione urbana
(i) Protezione dei monumenti storici
(j) Durata della procedura di revisione delle licenze edilizie
(k) Tassa sul plusvalore
6. Quale delle seguenti restrizioni di densità abitativa si applicano al vostro comune?
(Selezionare tutte le restrizioni applicabili.)
(a) Restrizioni di altezza e distanze limite
(b) Indici di utilizzazione
(c) Quota di spazio verde
7. Nel vostro comune, i costruttori devono in genere soddisfare i seguenti requisiti
per poter costruire? (S̀ı o no)
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(a) Per case unifamiliari e plurifamiliari:
i. Requisito di dimensioni minime del terreno (ad es. 1’000m2)
ii. Requisiti per gli indici di utilizzazione
iii. Quota ammissibile dei costi per il miglioramento delle infrastrutture
(b) Per lo sviluppo di grandi aree (quando si svolgono le trattative con i costrut-
tori):
0. Non applicabile al nostro comune.
i. Requisito di dimensioni minime del terreno (ad es. 1’000m2)
ii. Requisiti per gli indici di utilizzazione
iii. Inclusione dell’edilizia popolare e a basso costo (comunque definite)
iv. Fornitura obbligatoria di spazi aperti
v. Quota ammissibile dei costi per il miglioramento delle infrastrutture
8. Nel vostro comune, come si confronta l’offerta di terreni edificabili con la domanda
per i seguenti usi del suolo? (Molto più del necessario; Più del necessario; Abbas-





9. All’incirca a quanto ammontano i costi della licenza edilizia (per i richiedenti),
comprese le tasse cantonali ed esclusi i costi di allacciamento, nel vostro comune
per le seguenti proprietà:
(a) 1 casa plurifamiliare con 15 appartamenti: Prezzo di costruzione CHF 5‘000‘000.-
5‘460m3, 1‘175m2 superficie abitabile
(b) 1 casa plurifamiliare con 5 appartamenti: Prezzo di costruzione CHF 2‘000‘000.-
2‘160m3, 460m2 superficie abitabile
(c) 1 casa unifamiliare: Prezzo di costruzione CHF 700‘000.-, 750m3, 150m2
superficie abitabile
10. All’incirca quante domande di permesso di costruzione residenziale ha ricevuto il
vostro comune nel 2019?
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11. All’ incirca contro quante domande di permesso di costruzione residenziale il vostro
comune ha ricevuto obiezioni nel 2019?
12. Negli ultimi 10 anni, quanto sono cambiati all’incirca i costi dei permessi di
costruzione nel vostro comune? (<0%, 0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%,
¿50%)
13. Negli ultimi 10 anni, quanto sono cambiati all’incirca i costi di una casa unifamiliare
nel vostro comune? (<0%, 0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, ¿50%)
14. Negli ultimi 10 anni, quanto sono cambiati all’incirca i costi di un appartamento
nel vostro comune? (<0%, 0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, ¿50%)
15. Negli ultimi 10 anni, come è cambiata nel vostro comune la durata dalla richiesta
all’approvazione di un progetto di edilizia abitativa? (Significativamente più breve;




16. Nel vostro comune, quanto tempo dura attualmente una procedura di autoriz-
zazione edilizia per i seguenti progetti (se i documenti sono inseriti correttamente
e completamente)? (In giorni)
(a) Casa unifamiliare
(b) Casa plurifamiliare
17. È possibile presentare domande di costruzione in formato digitale nel vostro co-
mune? (S̀ı o no)
18. Quanto sono importanti i piani particolareggiati per l’uso del suolo per la pianifi-
cazione territoriale nel vostro comune? Valutate l’importanza di ciascuno su una
scala da 1 a 5. (1 = per niente importante; 5 = molto importante)
19. I seguenti fattori sociodemografici influenzano la pianificazione territoriale in ma-
teria di edilizia residenziale nella vostra comune?
(a) Età





20. Quale delle seguenti strategie di pianificazione territoriale si applica meglio al
vostro comune?
(a) Passivo: Tendenza de poco intervento e controllo.
(b) Proattivo: basato sulla crescita..
(c) Reattivo: intervento e cooperazione quando necessario.
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